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1. Introduction: Defining What Is to Be Explained 
In previous articles (Thome 1995, 2001) I have outlined 
a heuristic scheme for explaining the long-term trend in 
lethal violence in Europe since, roughly, the beginning of 
the sixteenth century. This paper now offers a more con-
cise and systematized version of this theoretical account 
and adds some reflections on methodological problems 
that arise when it is applied in empirical research.
My point of departure is a set of empirical observations 
that document (1) the long-term decline in lethal inter-
personal violence in Europe since about 1500 and (2) the 
upward trend in violent crime that has occurred more re-
cently – in the second half of the twentieth century – not 
only in Europe but in almost all of the economically ad-
vanced nations that combine democratic political struc-
tures with free-market economies (Gartner 1990). The 
“S-” or “U-shaped-curve” (depending on how far back one 
goes in history) of this development was depicted by Ted 
R. Gurr some twenty-five years ago when he investigated 
British court records on homicide indictments and other 
related sources (Gurr 1981; Gurr et al. 1977). More recently, 
in a series of papers Manuel Eisner (2003a; 2003b) has 
extended Gurr’s work considerably by compiling homicide 
data from nearly four hundred historical case studies that 
cover different European regions and nations in the pre-
modern era, and adding data from national vital or police 
recorded homicide statistics for the modern era. Thus, we 
now have a much better database that reduces the influence 
of the idiosyncrasies – the measurement errors – of each 
study in shaping the overall trend pattern. 
The pattern that emerges from these data basically con-
firms the picture drawn by Gurr. Eisner calculates a factor 
of more than thirty by which homicide rates decreased 
between the end of the medieval period and the middle 
of the twentieth century when the mean rate stood at less 
than one death per year per 100,000 inhabitants (Eisner 
2003a, 106). There are some discontinuities and short-term 
departures from the (trans-)secular trend line, but the 
decline as such is remarkably persistent through time. In 
addition, between the late nineteenth century and the 
1950s the national homicide rates in western Europe more 
or less converged and cross-national differences have 
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remained rather small since then. Even in non-European 
countries like New Zealand the homicide rates between 
1880 and 1990 clearly display the U-shaped trend pattern 
(Dunstall 2004). Of course, we do not know if the upward 
trend or level shift since around 1960 (roughly doubling 
the rates by 1990) will persist or whether it will yet be 
another short-lived departure from the long-term trend. 
In many countries there is a leveling off in homicide rates 
or even a slight decline during the 1990s, but other types 
of recorded violence, like serious assault and, in particular, 
robbery, have generally continued to rise strongly.1
For the sake of argument, I will assume that we are not 
facing a short- or medium-term discontinuity but rather, 
since the middle of the twentieth century, a reversal of the 
long-term trend in criminal violence. The task for sociology 
then is to construct a coherent theory that accounts for 
both the long decline and its reversal, i.e., the U-shaped-
pattern. If such a theory is available or can be constructed 
we may switch perspectives and predict that the increase 
in violent crime – at least a level shift, if not a continu-
ing upward movement – will persist beyond the present. 
Studying the discontinuities, the local and temporary 
departures from the trend, or the manifold “contextual 
trajectories” (Eisner) would certainly also be very instruc-
tive. But if we want to find the picture behind the puzzle 
we must first have an idea what it might look like. And in 
order to apprehend the meaning of the picture one first 
needs to know something about the principles and tech-
niques that were used in constructing it.
If the pattern is so consistent across the nations that have 
followed the Western type path of development,2 then we 
apparently have to relate these crime trends to fundamen-
tal structural changes that have shaped these societies – 
again in fairly similar ways. This has led some sociologists 
to use sweeping concepts like rationalization, individual-
ization, or social disintegration in their efforts to explain 
the increase in violent crime during the last forty or fifty 
years. But rationalization and individualization have been 
rising for several centuries during which interpersonal vio-
lence decreased, as indicated above. So these concepts are 
not sufficient, or at least they must be greatly refined and 
supplemented with additional hypotheses. What follows is 
an attempt at doing just that.
Being interested in theoretical generalizations, I have set up 
my explanatory scheme in terms of an explanandum and 
certain propositions and descriptive statements that are 
supposed to provide a basis for constructing the explanans. 
(The explanans itself is, as yet, far from being complete.) 
The phenomenon to be explained is the long-term trend in 
interpersonal violence, the U-shaped pattern documented 
in the work of Gurr, Eisner, and others. The core ideas for 
developing an explanation I have found in the work of 
Norbert Elias and Emile Durkheim. 
2. Concepts and Propositions: Building Blocks for Constructing 
a Theoretical Model
2.1. Elias’s Theory of Civilization
According to Elias, the major pacifying forces that have 
been unfolding in the long extended civilizing process (or 
processes) are the following (this is only a brief reminder): 
(1) The creation of the state monopoly on violence, its 
subsequent legitimation in the processes of democratiza-
tion, and its constriction by the rule of law. Anticipating 
my later references to Durkheim, I should like to add a 
fourth component or stage in the process of state and 
1 This is a revised and extended version of a paper 
presented at the conference on “Cultures of Vio-
lence: Incidence, Social Regulation and Perception 
of Violence, Past and Present,” organized by Sophie 
Body-Gendrot (Paris) and Pieter Spierenburg 
(Rotterdam), sponsored by the Posthumus Institute 
and the Groupe Européen des Rechereches sur les 
Normativités (GERN) and held in Ferrara, Italy, 
September 18, 2003.
· With respect to death rates (completed homicide) 
one has to take into account the improvements in 
medical services made over the years. For example, 
in the sense that this monopoly became established 
within European states. Third, the United States 
has experienced the biggest waves of immigration 
and most enduring ethnic conflicts among the 
Western states, and ethnic conflicts tend to come 
in cycles. The cyclical pattern that is to be observed 
in American homicide rates (Gurr 1989) may be 
amplified by the comparatively low level of social 
security benefits granted by the state and the high 
level of economic inequality and social marginal-
ization; both leave ordinary people highly exposed 
to the tide of economic ups and downs.
Harris et al. (2002) calculated that at the end of 
the 1990s the U.S. homicide rate would have been 
three times higher had no progress been made in 
medical services and equipment since the 1960s.
2 The major exceptions among the Western 
countries with respect to the U-shaped-curve are 
Finland, and the United States. On Finland (and 
its unique national history) see Ylikangas (1998). 
With respect to the United States, one first has 
to note that this nation came into existence as a 
modern state, a fully-fledged democracy. Second, 
there has never been a state monopoly of violence 
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nation-building: increasing social inclusion, the balancing 
of freedom and equality within the institutional framework 
of the welfare state (in short, “social democracy”). (2) The 
extension of the market economy implying the elongation 
of action chains and increasing functional interdepen-
dencies between individual and collective actors. More 
people are impelled to plan and strive for distant goals 
and places. (3) The promulgation of a culture of non-vio-
lence, an increasing condemnation of and even revulsion 
at the infliction of serious bodily harm including corporal 
punishment. (4) Finally, the transformation of personality 
structures in the direction of a greater capacity for affect 
control. Apart from the state and the market, other agen-
cies of formal and informal social control and generalized 
discipline have contributed to this – like school and fac-
tories and, not least, the processes of (religious) “confes-
sionalization.” Other scholars (like Weber, Oestreich, and 
Foucault) who have analyzed various disciplinary forces 
shaping modern cultures readily come to mind, but I will 
not consider specific contributions made along these lines.
Elias has shown all of these processes to be closely interre-
lated in a way that I will not draw out here. They are more 
or less cumulative and sufficiently continuous as to fit into 
a trend pattern that can be imagined to be inversely related 
to the secular decline of homicide rates. I do see some 
problems in Elias’s heavily Freudian conception of affect 
control (Thome 1995), but will not take up this point in 
the present discussion. Later on (in section 2.3), a revised 
concept of self-control will be proposed.
There are several routes through which the evolving struc-
tures of a centralized and democratic state have promoted 
the gradual reduction of criminal violence.3 The decisive 
point has been and still seems to be that the monopoly 
on violence becomes embedded within an institutional 
framework that integrates effectiveness and legitimacy, 
making one dependent upon the other. Given that this has 
happened in Europe (step by step, unevenly, and with retro-
grade movements), what are we to make of this hypothesis 
when we turn to the increase of violent crime since the 
1950s or 1960s? To maintain consistency in our reasoning 
three routes are open. The first one would be to argue that 
the legitimized and effective state monopoly on violence 
has been eroding for quite a while. If the development of 
the state’s monopoly on violence and its subsequent “do-
mestication” within liberal democratic systems has been 
and still is a major factor in bringing about decreasing rates 
of interpersonal violence, one should expect an increase of 
such violence if this monopoly is weakening or crumbling 
without being supplanted by functionally equivalent forces. 
The other alternative would be to demonstrate that the 
monopoly on violence has not been weakened significantly, 
but that other factors have come forward to push up crime 
rates. Finally, a third alternative – favored here – would be 
to consider both, an erosion of the monopoly of violence 
and some additional factors, as the driving forces behind 
the trend reversal.
Several scholars have argued in favor of the erosion hypoth-
esis. They have presented a number of indicators that sup-
port the hypothesis that the institutional nexus in which 
the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the state monopoly 
on violence were closely intertwined has started to erode 
and will continue to do so. The German sociologist Trutz 
von Trotha, for example, speaks of an “oligarchic-preven-
tive order of security” (OPOS) which, in his view, has been 
emerging in Western democracies during recent decades 
(von Trotha 1995). It is characterized, among other things, 
by the remarkable growth of private security industries 
and services (DeWaard 1999), moves towards privatiza-
tion of prisons, and the promulgation of community 
control orders. He notes that the newly emerging security 
system is without a “center”; that the responsibility of the 
agents of political and administrative power has, at least 
partially, been replaced by the purchasing power of clients 
in security markets and this transforms the structures of 
economic inequality into the social inequality of differen-
tially available security. This “commodification” of security 
normalizes the use of violence, which then progressively 
3 I am not dealing with the state’s potential for 
starting a war against other nations or misusing 
its powers in domestic affairs. This would make for 
another explanandum than the one chosen here.
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penetrates into the web of social relationships (von Trotha 
1995, 157–59; for further arguments see, e.g., Garland 1996; 
Gallagher 1995). “No-go-areas” outside the reach or con-
tinuous attention of (regular) police forces have been ex-
panding. A “culture of violent self-help” (von Trotha) is re-
emerging; the taboo on violence is losing ground among 
an increasing number of individuals and social groups 
(Eckert et al. 1989). In many European states people’s trust 
in governmental institutions has been in decline for quite 
a while (see, e.g., Inglehart 1997; Putnam 2000, 2001).
One should also note that discussions about a general 
“legitimation crisis” (Habermas 1973) and the dissolution 
of the functional prerogatives of the state (Luhmann 1981) 
have been with us for quite a while, not just since the 
1990s. In a more recent book, Gary LaFree (1998) links the 
rising crime rates in the United States since the 1960s to 
a wide variety of indicators of diminished legitimacy of 
social, political, and economic institutions. The protest 
movements that called into question the legitimacy of “the 
system” in the 1960s were primarily politically and moral-
ly motivated (e.g., civil rights and the Vietnam war in the 
United States, and in Germany the younger generation’s 
insistence on discussing responsibility for the terror of the 
Nazi era). A second, perhaps even more powerful, and still 
unfolding discussion about the delegitimation and dimin-
ishing regulative power of the state has been set in motion 
by various technological innovations and economic 
developments now summarized under such headings like 
“the information age” and “globalization” (see below). In 
these processes a positive feedback system seems to have 
established itself in which diminishing control capacities 
of the nation-state undermine its legitimacy and subse-
quently further diminish its regulatory powers (Castells 
1997; van Creveld 1999). In particular, globalizing free 
market economies have undermined the state’s monopoly 
of taxation upon which – to recall Elias – the monopoly 
on violence and other regulatory capacities had been 
founded. (We will return to this point in our discussion 
of Durkheim’s ideas.) On a more concrete level of analysis, 
one would have to talk about the internationalization of 
organized crime and about technological developments in 
weaponry and worldwide electronic communication that 
have put certain types of criminals into a rather advanta-
geous position over against the state. As a consequence, the 
state increasingly finds itself in a dilemma whereby it either 
has to let go or apply “big brother” strategies outside the 
previously legitimate boundaries (e. g., the extensive instal-
lation of CCTV surveillance systems, particularly in Great 
Britain, and other technologies of collecting and using pre-
viously non-accessible data on suspects and non-suspects).
Before taking up the second major element in Elias’s theory 
of civilization processes, i.e., affect- or self-control (section 
2.3), I will continue on the macro-level by bringing in some 
of the major concepts found in Durkheim’s work.
2.2. Durkheim: Structural Evolution and Social Pathologies
Some forty years before Elias wrote his now celebrated 
book on the processes of civilization, Durkheim sug-
gested that “with the progress of civilization homicide de-
creases” (Durkheim 1992, 113). He saw the reason for this 
in the demystification of the collectivity and its devaluation 
relative to the “worshipping” of the individual. “Collectiv-
ism” he construed as an integrative pattern in which the 
group – the family, the clan, the caste, a religious or ethnic 
community, the nation – was valued more, much more, 
than the individual and his or her well-being. The collec-
tivity takes on the quality of a sacred being demanding 
harsh reactions against those who step out of line, thereby 
creating a culture of violence. High levels of passion and 
low respect for the individual render the individual more 
likely to become the object of physical attacks by others. 
The major organizing principles that foster violence are 
“honor” and “hierarchy.” The importance of honor (and its 
counterpart, defamation) has been widely recognized in 
the literature (e.g., Spierenburg 1998), and I have nothing 
to add to it in the present paper. With respect to hierarchy 
(cf. Roth 2001, 47), I should like to emphasize the following 
aspect. If the group counts more than the individual, there 
are typically particular individuals that are closer to the 
gods than the masses; there are leaders and followers, mas-
ters and servants, insiders and outsiders. In other words, 
there is rigid stratification, and the members of various 
strata differ in the amount of honor, respect, and general 
worth granted to them. These differences seem to have a 
criminogenic effect on their own. Eisner, in analyzing data 
provided by Ruggiero on violent offenders in early Renais-
sance Venice, notes that “upper-class people seemingly 
victimized people of lower standing more often than vice 
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versa, which…contrasts strikingly with modern patterns. 
Nobles, it appears, did not scruple to assault, rape, or kill 
people of lower standing” (Eisner 2003a, 116). It would be 
interesting to consider whether there has been a return 
of hierarchy in (post-)modern “winner-take-all” societies 
(Frank and Cook 1995), and with it the return of certain 
routines of adoration and defamation on which the mass 
media thrive.4
Traditional collectivism had to break down in the course 
of increasing social differentiation. The individual now is 
no longer tied into a closely knit mesh of norms, symbols, 
and rituals that define his or her own identity in terms of 
belonging to the collectivity. The fusion of personal and 
collective identities dissolves. Violations of social norms 
that occur somewhere in the group are no longer of im-
mediate personal concern. The individual’s social standing 
and reputation are no longer defined by a code of honor 
that, for example, makes blood revenge obligatory. The 
expression of identities becomes less body-centered (this 
trend may also have been reversed recently); violence that 
injures, mutilates, or kills another person becomes repug-
nant, abominable. There is a “collective conscience” even 
in individualized societies, but the highest-ranking value 
in it is the individual “in general” as Durkheim empha-
sizes; not just the individual “self” but also the individual 
“other.” And such a system implies a lower level of passion 
and stronger control of emotions. The reason why passions 
are lower or more constrained in individualist cultures 
seems to be that the person who violates the norms (and 
is to be punished for that) is, so to speak, an incarnation 
of the very object which is now being worshipped, i.e., 
the individual in general (Durkheim 1978). This seems to 
be reminiscent of Elias, but note the shift in perspective: 
large-scale pacification is effected not by disciplinary forc-
es holding down individual impulses but by freeing the 
individual from the closely knit bonds that kept him tied 
to the collectivity. Restructured agents of social control 
and moral guidance, particularly the (nuclear) family, the 
school, and professional organizations, however, remain 
important for providing the moral underpinnings of social 
life in modern societies. Durkheim believes, however, that 
it is not so much the rise of individualism but rather the 
erosion of collectivism that directly causes the reduction in 
the number of homicides (Durkheim 1992, 115).
There is some empirical evidence from cross-national stud-
ies indicating that there is a positive correlation between 
the degree of collectivism and the level of interpersonal 
violence in a society (Karstedt 2001). One problem with 
testing this proposition is that the erosion of collectivism 
and the formation of the state generally have co-evolved, 
more or less (at least in Europe), throughout history so 
that the pacifying effect of one of these processes can 
hardly be disentangled from the effect of the other. 
A strategy for circumventing this problem is the study of 
cross-sectional units that differ with respect to collectivism 
but stand equally under the jurisdiction of the same state. 
Following this strategy I have utilized data on more than 
five hundred urban and rural counties in Prussia at the 
end of the nineteenth century and treated birthrates as an 
empirical indicator of the degree of collectivism vs. indi-
vidualism prevalent in a county. In a multivariate analysis 
it was shown that birthrate was by far the most powerful 
predictor of violent crime (serious assault and battery) 
controlling for various indicators of economic develop-
ment, demographic and ethnic composition, degree of 
urbanization, and dominant religious confession. Another 
noteworthy result that emerged from these analyses is the 
following: Though violent crime (severe bodily harm) was 
generally rising between 1880 and 1900 the rates in highly 
urbanized areas remained generally below the rates in ru-
ral counties by a margin of about 20 percent (though not 
equally in all regions) (Thome 2002; parts of the analysis 
are also presented in Thome 2001). This is important to 
note, because it demonstrates the necessity to distinguish 
between (anomic) developmental and structural effects. 
Rapid change may, for some time, bring about higher 
crime rates even though the emerging social structure 
may be less criminogenic than the old one.
4  Baumeister et al. (1996) review some of the 
psychological literature confirming the violent 
implications arising from claims of superiority. 
For the connection between sharpened economic 
competition and the “renaturalization” of inequal-
ity resulting in differential claims of moral worth, 
i.e. superiority, see Bauman (1990), Young (1958); 
see also footnote 7 below.
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If we are prepared to accept Durkheim’s hypothesis on the 
effects of collectivism, an even more formidable problem 
seems to arise. If the erosion of collectivism is said to 
explain the long decline of violence, how do we account 
for the rise of illegal violence in the second half of the 
twentieth century – a period that has brought us even 
more individualism? Does this observation not falsify our 
(Durkheim’s) hypothesis? I will try to answer this objection 
by specifying the concept of individualism along the lines 
Durkheim proposed. The answer will be that only a specific 
type of individualism protects against violence or, rather, 
preserves the pacifying consequences of the eclipse of col-
lectivism. Figure 1 presents the two analytical dimensions 
on which Durkheim’s typology of “normal” and “patho-
logical” states of society rests (Hynes 1975; Besnard 1993):
Figure 1: Durkheim’s analytical scheme
The horizontal axis represents the dimension of cultural 
and structural evolution from collectivism to individual-
ism, from mechanical to organic solidarity, or from a seg-
mentally differentiated and hierarchically stratified society 
to a functionally differentiated society, as we would put it 
today. Durkheim’s major concern here is with integration, 
viz. coordination. The slanting vertical axis represents a 
more actor-oriented analytic dimension, i.e. “regulation,”5 
which is foremost the domain of the state or the political 
subsystem including secondary groups and public dis-
course. If regulation optimally fits in with the possibilities 
and restrictions given by the structural elements inherent to 
“modern” societies (with – primarily – functional instead of 
segmentary differentiation), then Durkheim’s ideal type of 
“cooperative” or “moral” individualism should be realized.
Particularly in Suicide (1951), Durkheim was concerned 
with two major “pathologies” that he thought would 
threaten the future course of societal development: one 
would be “anomie” (a lack or breakdown of regulation), the 
other “excessive” or “egoistic” individualism. The analyti-
cal scheme provides for a third pathology: over-regulation, 
which in Durkheim’s terminology figures as “fatalism” 
(perhaps a misleading term, since it connotes subjective 
reactions rather than the normative arrangements and 
material conditions that might cause them). Here, severe 
restrictions imposed on the autonomy of the individual 
run counter to the opportunities provided by the degree of 
social differentiation and economic productivity reached 
within the given society. Durkheim downplayed the role of 
this particular pathology, but I think that there are good 
reasons to include it in our heuristic scheme. So let me 
briefly characterize each of the four social types, first the 
allegedly “normal” type.
2.2.1. Moral or Cooperative Individualism
I have already characterized this type in terms of its cul-
tural orientation. It refers to a broad consensus according 
to which the individual is more valued than the group. But 
it is not the particularized – egoistic – individual that is 
addressed here, but rather a universalistic conception, the 
individual “in general.” As a philosophical perspective, 
Durkheim’s moral individualism comes close to contem-
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5 The axis is slanting to indicate some measure 
of correlation both between anomie and egoistic 
individualism and, on the other side, between 
fatalism and collectivism.
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porary communitarianism (however with a completely 
different conception of the state). As a social praxis, moral 
individualism is based on mutual sympathy and respect for 
others – any other person; it seeks to increase social inclu-
sion and it postulates the right of self-actualization for all.
On the socio-structural and political plane this type seeks 
to secure justice and to balance personal freedom and 
equality, mainly by combining social welfare provisions 
and parliamentary democracy. Durkheim insists on the 
functional primacy of the state over the economy, which he 
saw as immanently amoral. On the other hand, he clearly 
considered it necessary to counterbalance the power of the 
state by strong secondary social groups – thereby antici-
pating what political scientists and sociologists have later 
conceptualized as various forms of “corporatism” (e.g., 
Siaroff 1999; Kenworthy 2002, Hall, and Gingerich 2004). 
Measures of decommodification and corporatism have 
also been used in criminological research, e.g., by Messner 
and Rosenfeld (1997) and Pampel and Gartner (1995).
When evaluating the trend concerning the development of 
cooperative individualism, one may also look at indicators 
discussed in the literature on “social capital,” like member-
ship in voluntary associations or generalized social trust 
(Putnam 2000, 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Participa-
tion rates in national elections (after partialling out event-
specific effects) might also be a useful indicator of shifting 
weights between cooperative versus egoistic individualism. 
Cooperative individualism implies a principled readiness 
to invest in collective goods (like having a democratic 
government) even without calculable individual payoffs 
(resulting from one’s own investment) or losses (result-
ing from making no personal investments). The “collec-
tive good” dilemma involved in voting, e.g., is overcome 
by individuals who feel a moral obligation (responsibility) 
to vote, whereas from a purely instrumentalist perspec-
tive voting is simply irrational. Shifting membership rates 
among different types of associations might be evaluated 
in terms of implied contributions they make for collective 
goods versus individual payoffs.
2.2.2. Egoistic (Excessive) Individualism
On the cultural plane, this is the reversion of the defin-
ing characteristics of moral individualism: particularism 
instead of universalism; hedonistic self-fulfillment instead 
of social solidarity; ruthless pursuit of one’s own interests 
while using others as a mere “means” in strategic interac-
tions. In the tradition of the Frankfurt School of social 
thought, it is the triumph of “instrumentalism” or, in 
Habermas’s terms, the dominance of strategic interaction 
over communicative action seeking mutual understanding 
and recognition (Habermas 1981).6 With regard to social 
structure and politics it implies the functional primacy of 
the economy and the expansion of market competition into 
other realms of social life, the diminution (if not disman-
tling) of welfare state provisions, the recommodification 
of social relationships, and the strengthening of forces that 
advance social marginalization and exclusion. Tocqueville 
already warned that materialism and egoism triggered by 
too much competition would threaten the moral base for 
political democracy. Durkheim himself, in his book on 
suicide, did not interpret egoistic individualism as a force 
that would promote violence; he saw it only as an aggra-
vating condition with respect to suicide. I have argued 
elsewhere that his reasoning is not convincing on this 
point (Thome 2004).7
As for Durkheim, the role of the state is crucial for safe-
guarding moral individualism against egoistic individual-
ism. He conceives the state as being “the organ of moral 
discipline” (Durkheim 1992, 72, 69), but he also sees it 
as the champion of individualism. Without the state the 
individual could not have been set free from his primor-
dial bonds, without the state there would be no power to 
protect the individual against the “tyrannical” claims of 
his group. Durkheim expressly rejects the Hegelian, the 
socialist, and the utilitarian (liberal) conceptions of the 
6 Gary LaFree (referring to work done by Stef-
fensmeier) notes that in the United States “the 
rate of instrumental, felony-related killings (e.g., 
contract murders) increases substantially during 
the postwar period (from about 7 percent of all 
murders in 1960 to about 20 percent in 1990)” 
(LaFree 1998, 40–41). British data, however, do not 
reveal such a trend.
7 On the causal connections between a culture 
of competition, social and economic inequality, 
and violence see also Hagan et al. (1998), Jacobs 
and Carmichael (2002), Messner (2004), and 
Pescosolido and Rubin (2000). Studying data from 
European surveys conducted in 1969 and repeated 
in 1990, David Halpern (2001) found evidence for 
increasing importance attached to “self-interest.” 
He also found a rather strong positive relationship 
between aggregated self-interest and national vic-
timization rates, particularly when combined with 
relatively high levels of social inequality.
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state. What he had in mind was a democratic state whose 
power had to be limited by strong secondary groups and 
free social associations that would mediate between the 
individual and the state. The state, however, should have 
adequate regulatory power to implement the measures 
necessary for securing sufficient degrees of justice, equity, 
and equality – which Durkheim considered to be the 
structural precondition without which moral individual-
ism could not prevail.
The processes of globalization that were set in motion 
by the dismantling of the Bretton Woods agreement in 
the early 1970s followed by the liberalization of financial 
capital markets in the 1980s and further accelerated by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union have gradually undermined 
the role and legitimacy of the nation-state, in particular 
its regulative power regarding the economy. Nation-states, 
even within the European Union, have come to compete 
with each other in providing the most favorable condi-
tions for attracting economic investments. The average tax 
rate on corporate profits in twenty-one OECD countries 
fell from about 50 percent in the mid-1980s to 32 percent 
in 2003 (Ganghof 2005). At the same time the low-income 
sector has been expanding broadly. In this process the 
secular trend towards more equality has been reversed: 
inequality in income and assets has been rising in almost 
all OECD countries since the mid- or late 1970s (Smeeding 
2002). Despite continuous economic growth (in terms of 
real GDP), large segments of the populations have actually 
suffered from falling real incomes, which has increased 
the number of people forced into or threatened by social 
marginalization and exclusion. Apart from measures that 
capture inequality, poverty, and the generosity of public 
welfare provisions (for the latter see Scruggs 2005; Scruggs 
and Allan 2006), further indicators that one may want to 
consider in this context are, for example, the number of 
insolvencies of firms and private households (severity of 
competition), the volume of consumer credit in relation to 
income (indicative of the prevalence of economic aspira-
tions), the volume of advertising and sponsoring activi-
ties (competition and expanding commercialization), the 
share of individually paid fees for using public services 
and facilities relative to public funding (downgrading the 
role of the citizen – and the public good – relative to that 
of the consumer and the private good), and the number 
of people who never have children and the number of 
children who live with one parent only (reduced weight of 
institutions outside the economy).
2.2.3. Anomie or Lack of Regulation
Durkheim propounded (but did not systematically elabo-
rate) different versions of the concept of “anomie” that, 
due to space limitations, cannot be discussed here in any 
detail (see Thome 2003). In my understanding Durkheim 
considers three major subtypes of anomie in The Divi-
sion of Labor in Society (Durkheim 1933). One is a lack of 
coordination or a functional imbalance between different 
societal subsystems (like the economy and education); 
another is the discrepancy between diverse role require-
ments on one side and the actors’ need for self-actualiza-
tion. The third has become the most prominent one in the 
literature: anomie as a lack of cognitive and normative ori-
entation making conformity to moral and legal rules less 
likely. These tendencies are most prominent in times of 
rapid social and economic change so that we may speak of 
a developmental or process-induced variant of anomie. But 
in Suicide (1951) Durkheim also envisioned the possibil-
ity of “chronic” anomie induced by the internal dynamics 
of an economy that is bound to defy moral and political 
constrictions, i.e., a structural type of anomie. Witnessing 
the first round of economic globalization in modern times 
he observes: “Ultimately, this liberation of desires has been 
made worse by the very development of industry and the 
almost infinite extension of the market. (…) Now that he 
[the producer, H.T.] may assume to have almost the entire 
world as his customer, how could passions accept their for-
mer confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?“ 
(Durkheim 1951, 255 et seq.). 
On this point, the pathologies of egoistic individualism 
and structurally rather than developmentally induced 
anomie collapse into one category that we might label 
as disintegrative individualism.8 Under the structural 
conditions of chronic anomie “excessive individualism” 
8 Though Durkheim, in his book on Suicide, 
concedes that “anomic” and “egoistic” suicide 
might empirically merge, he insists on keeping 
both types analytically distinct. In the literature 
there have been lively debates on the feasibility and 
validity of this distinction, see, e.g., Hynes (1975) 
or Johnson (1965).
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loses its character as a temporary or minor deviation from 
the “normal” type of moral or cooperative individualism; 
instead it becomes an evolutionary type of its own (not 
explicated by Durkheim himself). There is considerable 
conceptual overlap between “disintegrative individualism” 
(conceived in this way) and Merton’s structural anomie 
or Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). This, however, needs to be 
worked out in detail in another paper.9
One major idea underlying Durkheim’s developmental 
variant of anomie, however, remains important in my 
heuristic scheme designed to account for the rise of violent 
crime between 1950 and the late 1970s: rapid social change 
– in whatever direction – is likely to produce anomie, i.e. 
high levels of “normlessness.” Though Durkheim, again, 
did not clearly specify the mechanisms through which this 
happens, two routes are suggested: (1) Previous regulations 
(norms) become obsolete, counter-productive, or inconsis-
tent, whereas the emergence of more adequate new regula-
tions lags behind the dynamic development of productive 
forces and structural change.10 (2) Personal aspirations 
tend to rise beyond the capacity to fulfill them and threat-
en the individual’s sense of personal integrity and having 
an identity anchored within a social community.
During the 1950s and 1960s the economically prosperous 
countries (not only in Europe) underwent great social 
change with unusually high GDP growth rates. For most 
people in the early 1950s everyday activities concerning 
social life and human sustenance were still organized 
primarily on a local level. For example, in Germany at that 
time 40 percent of the labor force were employed in the 
traditional sector: farming and small-scale manufacturing, 
service, and retail trades (Lutz 1984). Even the majority 
of those who worked in the industrial sector were closely 
and primarily integrated into local milieus. Most people 
possessed no car, had no telephone, and had no television 
available in their own household. Only a minority of peo-
ple had access to more than eight years of school education. 
All this changed rapidly within ten or fifteen years. If the 
developmental variant of the anomie concept has any va-
lidity it should be a major factor in accounting for the take-
off phase in rising rates of violent crime since the 1950s. 
But unlike developments toward the end of the nineteenth 
century (as indicated above), the changes initiated in the 
1950s ultimately paved the way for a more, not less, crimi-
nogenic social and cultural structure. It must be admitted, 
however, that there is an ad hoc element in the explanatory 
scheme I am proposing, since there is convincing evidence 
that cooperative individualism was actually strengthened 
during the early phase of these developmental changes, 
not least by expanding welfare state provisions and by 
transforming family structures to become less hierarchic 
(i.e. less “collectivistic”). Unfortunately we do not have the 
means to clearly calculate and quantify the respective ef-
fects of these contradictory factors. 
As already indicated, chronic anomie or disintegrative 
individualism refers to a cultural and social system whose 
internal structural dynamics imply a persistently high 
tempo of social change in the direction of undermining 
the characteristic features of cooperative individualism. 
Technological and organizational changes within the 
realm of mass communication via television, internet, mo-
bile phones, and video have become a decisive force in this 
process. Here again, we can draw upon Durkheim’s ideas 
about anomie by generalizing his notion of “aspirations” 
becoming unlimited or unfettered. The modern technolo-
gies of communication have greatly enhanced the possibili-
9 Much of what has been said by Polanyi (1944), 
Hirsch (1976), and Frank and Cook (1995) is also 
pertinent in this context.
10 The significance of such processes becomes obvi-
ous when we consider one of the major functions 
social norms perform: giving certitude and stability 
to expectations that govern the daily interchanges 
among people (Luhmann 1969). The crucial point 
here is that expectations based on norms (unlike 
“cognitive” expectations) can be maintained even 
when they have not been met; the fault, in this case, 
is not attributed to the expectation but to those who 
have not conformed to it. This mechanism, how-
ever, breaks down when falsifications are mount-
ing: incertitude replaces certitude. Transmitting 
norms from one generation to another is the major 
route towards internalization. Unrestricted (and 
time-consuming) “discourse” among equals may 
be considered to be an important method for re-
solving moral conflict or dilemmas on the basis of 
universally held moral principles (Habermas 1981). 
Rapid social change is detrimental to both of them. 
For example, normative traditions provide no 
solutions for the moral dilemmas posed by recent 
advances in genetics, biotechnology, and medicine. 
The options these open up expand faster than the 
capacity to define or apply the criteria for choosing 
among them and creating a social consensus that 
would support them. Consequently, moral ques-
tions are being transformed into economic and 
political questions, thus strengthening the impetus 
towards instrumentalist thinking.
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ties to open up diverse avenues of “Entgrenzung”: a general-
ized tendency or momentum towards lifting, tearing down, 
or dissolving boundaries wherever they are encountered, 
the transgression of symbolic demarcation lines, and the 
conflation or blurring of semantic meanings, the philoso-
phy of “everything goes.” Two instances or subdimensions 
of Entgrenzung seem to be particularly important.
The first is the blending or fusion of the private and the 
public sphere (Sennett 1977). Just think of certain shows 
on television, the gossip in the newspapers and magazines, 
and, not least, the increasing availability of personal data 
to commerce and state agencies. The distinctness of the 
private and the public sphere, however, is constitutive for 
our personal integrity and dignity, and it is a prerequisite 
for the integration of society. Functionally differentiated 
societies secure their integration chiefly by roles, not by 
persons. When personal affairs overshadow performance 
of a role the functioning of the system is impaired – con-
sider the detrimental effects that were inflicted on the U.S. 
administration by the mass media’s revelations about 
President Clinton’s sex life. The routinized exhibitionism 
that figures so prominently in TV programs and tabloid 
newspapers tends to reduce people’s sensitivity and make 
them less attentive to other people’s vulnerability. With re-
spect to crime, it also has a more direct effect by reducing 
the preventive effect of nescience (“Präventivwirkung des 
Nicht-Wissens”), a phrase coined by the German sociolo-
gist Heinrich Popitz (1968) who observed that compliance 
with social norms is greatly facilitated by widespread igno-
rance (or at least the pretense of it) about deviant behavior 
by others.
A second subdimension of Entgrenzung is given by the 
blurring or blotting out of distinctions constituting the 
symbolic order of meaning, e.g., the distinction between 
the “profane” and the “sacred,” between truth and false-
hood, real and imagined worlds, or, on another plane, the 
“destructuring” of the distinction between the lifeworld 
of children and the lifeworld of adults. Driving forces 
behind these processes are the marketing and advertis-
ing business. Another arena where the symbolic order 
of meaning becomes increasingly tenuous is the field of 
genetics, biotechnology, and medicine (already referred 
to in footnote 10) where research seems to have opened up 
nearly unlimited possibilities of shaping – and perhaps 
copying – the human body (or parts of it) and manipulat-
ing the chemistry of the human brain. This threatens to 
undermine the foundations on which any system of mo-
rality has to rest: the distinction between what is given by 
nature or divine providence and what is left to the respon-
sibility of human beings making their own decisions and 
being accountable for them.11
It is no easy task to find meaningful quantitative indicators 
of the varied phenomena of Entgrenzung over time. Re-
search on the changing content and consumption patterns 
of mass media and the use of modern information tech-
nologies (internet, etc.) might provide valuable data. The 
increasing intrusion of advertisements and product place-
ment into TV programs and internet platforms, the growth 
of “infotainment,” and the expanding business of “event 
management” (i.e., the art of inventing techniques and 
practices which generalize the principle that “the medium 
becomes the message”) might be indicative of the blending 
of previously distinct symbolic universes. The sky-rocket-
ing salaries of business managers and investment bankers 
that have severed any ties with discernible achievements 
and performances, the volatility of stock market indices, 
and the rising discrepancies between share value and real 
assets of a firm may all be indicative of the progressive 
blending of the “real” and the “imagined.” With respect to 
encroachments on privacy, the installation of video cam-
eras in public places and buildings, and the sales volumes 
of various devices for collecting personal data (of consum-
ers and clients, for example) are all trackable over time.
2.2.4. Over-regulation: Regressive Collectivism
Durkheim’s concept of “fatalism” (in his book on Suicide) 
refers to suppressive conditions and norms that make 
life unbearable to a person, thereby pushing them to-
wards committing suicide. In a way, I would like to turn 
11 Consider, for example, Charles Taylor’s observa-
tion that making strong valuations, as in moral 
commitments, presupposes that something is be-
yond our reach, beyond our capacities (Taylor 1989).
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Durkheim’s concept upside down. Rather than concentrat-
ing on a purely subjective response to a dreadful situation 
brought about by suppressive means of regulation, we can 
think of “over-regulation” as a desired state of affairs that is 
seen as a remedy to another dreadful condition caused by 
the lack of regulation or expanding disintegrative individ-
ualism. This orientation, though arising within modern so-
cieties, refers back to traditional social forms incorporating 
collectivistic orientations. To set it apart from “traditional” 
collectivism we may speak of “regressive” collectivism. 
This orientation manifests itself in all forms of xenophobia, 
intolerance towards those who think differently, contempt 
for democratic principles and procedures, and attempts 
at defining certain people or groups as being inferior by 
nature thereby emphasizing hierarchy and leadership over 
against equity and participation. Large collections of sur-
vey data provide useful information on these issues.
2.2.5 The “Normalcy” of Crime
Durkheim considered crime to be a “normal,” even neces-
sary, social fact in all societies. The “normal” level of crime 
was to be inferred from some type- and phase-specific av-
erage: “A social fact is normal, in relation to a given social 
type at a given phase of its development, when it is present 
in the average society of that species at the corresponding 
phase of its evolution” (Durkheim 1938, 64). Even though 
we may find somewhat lacking his “rules for the classifica-
tion of social types” (Durkheim 1938, chapter 4) and his 
suggestions as to how to calculate averages and deviations 
that would qualify as being “pathological” (ibid., 55), 
I still find Durkheim’s conception helpful for at least two 
reasons. First, it draws our attention to the possibility 
that a crime rate might be too low. Durkheim believed 
that a certain level of crime was needed to keep open or 
clear the way for social creativity and innovation (modern 
type totalitarian regimes have amply demonstrated what 
this might possibly mean). Second, it opens up a histori-
cal perspective: what is normal depends on the given 
type of society, the evolutionary path it has followed, the 
basic principles and mechanisms that organize social life, 
economic productions and transactions, and the symbolic 
patterns of meaning. Different levels of crime may thus 
reflect “modes” rather than “degrees” of social integration. 
Collectivistic societies have a range of normal crime that 
differs from that which applies to individualized societies; 
and when the balance shifts from cooperative to egoistic 
or disintegrative individualism the normal rate changes 
again. Even though we may not be able to define levels of 
normality for a single case we may still be able to predict 
changes when we move across time or between societies. 
The increasing convergence of crime rates among advanced 
nations, the uniformity of the trend pattern noted above, 
suggests that all these societies have been shaped by the 
same fundamental evolutionary processes (beyond all the 
context-specific trajectories and regional particularities 
that need to be recognized as well). In a historical perspec-
tive, lower crime rates do not necessarily indicate better or 
more integrated societies but may point to differing modes 
of integration and “structuration.”
2.3. Macro-Micro Linkages: The Role of Self-control
Though crime rates are characteristics of groups or regions, 
they are nothing but standardized aggregates of classi-
fied individual behavior. So it would be useful to specify 
the intervening variables that transform structures (as 
considered above) into individual actions. When looking 
at various approaches in the theory of crime one encoun-
ters at least a dozen of them, middle-range theories each 
specifying bundles of variables thought to be conducive to 
crime in general or to criminal violence in particular – for 
example, differential social learning theory, social disor-
ganization theory, theories of subculture, strain theories, 
control theories, opportunity theory. Decades of research 
have passed by, thousands of articles and books have been 
written, but no single unified theory has emerged (though 
some authors have claimed that they had accomplished 
just this). Many of these different approaches do not really 
compete with each other but simply focus on different sub-
sets of variables that prove relevant on different occasions. 
A multitude of possible linkages connecting macro-struc-
tures and criminal behavior could thus be constructed. 
Before getting lost in such an exercise it might be more 
feasible to be selective and adhere to the principle of parsi-
mony. Most approaches to analyzing violent crime look at 
it as resulting from some kind of deficiency. For example, 
the actor has insufficient command over or access to legiti-
mate means for obtaining commonly sought or accepted 
goods to which he aspires. (Highly competitive cultures 
and high degrees of inequality tend to open up this gap for 
a large number of persons). Or the actor is situated within 
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a social environment that exerts little control upon him, 
or he belongs to a subculture insufficiently integrated into 
society. Or the actor himself has insufficient control over 
impulses impelling him to commit deviant acts includ-
ing physical aggression. He may not get the recognition 
and respect that he would need to acquire or maintain a 
sufficient degree of self-assurance or self-respect because 
he is discriminated against or because he does not have 
the instrumental or expressive capacities for being well 
received by others. Again, high competitiveness and ex-
clusivistic solidarities nourished by regressive collectivism 
may render such experiences more likely.
In their General Theory of Crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990) declared, in a way reminiscent of Elias, lack of self-
control to be the key variable making all sorts of criminal 
acts more likely to occur. Their argument, however, is 
somewhat simplistic: crime doesn’t pay, they say, therefore 
criminal behavior is irrational. As Gary Becker (1968) and 
others (e.g., Freeman 1995, Morselli and Tremblay 2004) 
have shown, however, many criminal acts do have a siz-
able payoff or, at least, can be expected to have one. There-
fore, they do not generally result from a lack of self-control 
as construed by Gottfredson and Hirschi. But numerous 
studies and meta-analyses (cf. Pratt and Cullen 2000) have 
demonstrated that lack of self-control is indeed a relevant 
proximate cause of criminal behavior.
The concept of self-control should however be expanded 
in the direction of a more sociological concept of “agency.” 
Drawing upon a similar idea put forward by Manuel Eis-
ner (1997) I propose a three-dimensional concept. The first 
dimension would, indeed, take up the idea of affect con-
trol: the capacity to control one’s impulses and emotions 
without suppressing them, allowing the person to express 
his or her feelings while taking into account the normative 
requirements encountered in a given situation. This might 
be called expressive competence. The second component 
would be of a strategic nature: the capacity to use one’s 
personal abilities and the opportunities offered by the situ-
ation to obtain one’s goals, including the capacity to evalu-
ate immediately available rewards in their consequences 
for long-term objectives: this we might call strategic or 
instrumental competence. The third component refers to 
moral consciousness, the capacity and the willingness 
to balance one’s personal interest against those of others 
while taking into account given social norms and, on a 
higher level of competence, universal principles as well 
(principles that might contravene group-based norms). 
This involves the capacity for “role taking” (as sociologists 
like to call it) or “ sympathetic empathy” (as psycholo-
gists put it). We might refer to this as normative or moral 
competence that comprises a motivational and a cognitive 
component which, however, might be less congruously 
related to each other than Kohlberg has postulated (Nun-
ner-Winkler 2004). 
This multi-dimensional concept goes beyond Elias’s or 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s dichotomy by shifting our 
attention to the individual’s capacity to integrate several 
functional requirements: identities must be expressed, long-
range personal interests must be pursued, non-exclusivistic 
solidarities must be preserved, and none of these at the cost 
of neglecting the other. To the extent that this capacity is 
lacking vis-à-vis the restrictions and opportunities offered 
in a given situation, the probability rises that the individ-
ual will resort to criminal activities, including the use of 
illegal violence. Durkheim’s pathological types (excessive 
individualism, anomie, and oppressive over-regulation) 
refer to structural conditions that, in a given population, 
impede the development of sufficient measures of (inte-
grative) self-control among a relevant number of persons. 
I have indicated some of these linkages in previous sections. 
For example, rapid social change and the decay of symbolic 
structures of meaning (i.e., “anomie”) undermine com-
municative processes needed to build up moral compe-
tence. Likewise, the erosion of cooperative individualism 
by increased competition and re-commodification of social 
relationships may de-emphasize normative considerations 
in favor of instrumental rationality. And if the future 
becomes increasingly uncertain, e.g., in terms of employ-
ment or return on investments, delayed gratification 
becomes less plausible. Consequently, strong internalized 
control structures are less likely to develop.
2.4. Summary: The Core Hypotheses Incorporated in the Heuristic Scheme
The major components of the explanatory scheme present-
ed here can be summed up in the following way:
(1) The (trans-)secular decline in interpersonal violence 
(homicide rates) that took place between ca. 1500 and 
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1950 is mainly due to (a) the processes of nation-building 
that established a monopoly on violence held by the state 
that became gradually domesticated by law, legitimized 
by democratic participation, and supported by evolving 
social welfare systems; (b) structural and cultural changes 
(from segmental to functional differentiation) that moved 
modernizing societies away from “collectivistic” to 
predominantly “individualistic” orientations and institu-
tional arrangements.
(2a) The institutional nexus in which the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence mutually 
supported each other has been eroding in post-industrial 
societies in the second half of the twentieth century.
(2b) The opportunity structure and the motivation for ille-
gal uses of violence have been enhanced in these processes.
(3a) The pacifying effect of the erosion of traditional col-
lectivism can only be maintained to the extent by which 
cooperative individualism dominates over against the 
forces of egoistic viz. disintegrative individualism.
(3b) Since the mid-1970s free-market post-industrial soci-
eties have been evolving in the direction of strengthening 
the elements of egoistic individualism and anomie (i.e., 
disintegrative individualism) which in turn also stimulate, 
at least temporarily, the growth of regressive collectivism.
(4) The take-off phase in rising levels of violent crime was 
set in motion by rapid and particularly incisive social 
changes taking place in the 1950s and 1960s (developmental 
anomie).
(5a) The lower the capacity for integrative self-control 
the higher the propensity to engage in deviant behavior 
including violent crime. 
(5b) In postindustrial societies there is a widening gap 
between the quality of self-control demanded from the 
individual person and the average level of self-control 
actually obtained.
3. Some Methodological Problems
All these hypotheses, to be sure, bear the marks of specu-
lative thinking. Now I will consider some of the method-
ological problems that come up when we try to apply and 
test the propositions just presented.
The hypotheses that make up the explanatory scheme out-
lined above introduce several key concepts that need to be 
measured somehow. That is, one needs to establish observ-
able indicators that are either correlationally or analyti-
cally related to such concepts as legitimacy, anomie, or 
instrumentalism. In previous sections I have offered some 
suggestions regarding such indicators, but all of them are 
open to debate. For example: How do we measure whether 
or to what extent there has been an erosion of the state’s 
monopoly of violence? Are clearance rates a valid indica-
tor for its effectiveness? (Probably not in the short run, but 
possibly in the long run). These problems are not unique to 
the approach I am recommending here; they are common 
to any approach trying to relate macro-social structures 
to rates of crime or other types of problem behavior in a 
cross-sectional or cross-temporal perspective (e.g., Eis-
ner 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, or the overview in 
Messner 2003). The relationship between (observable) in-
dicators and a nonobservable theoretical construct is (and 
must be) hypothetical; the burden of proof thus lies with 
those who want to criticize a specific choice.
In order to illustrate the kind of discussion that might 
come up on such an occasion let me briefly return to my 
decision to use birth rates as an indicator of the degree 
of collectivism vs. individualism present in the culture 
of a given nation or region in the late nineteenth century 
(Thome 2001, 2002). Of course, high birth rates do not 
“mean” high degrees of collectivism, but they may still 
serve as “correlative” indicators. There are two possibili-
ties here: first, lower birthrates might be a consequence of 
less collectivism; second, the demographic transition that 
was taking place in late nineteenth century brought about 
higher survival rates of children, thus inducing (potential) 
parents to opt for having fewer children (thereby produc-
ing lower birthrates) – which, in turn, raised the value of 
the individual child, i.e., fostered “individualism” in the 
sense construed by Durkheim. One objection might be 
that birthrates correlate with other variables, like demo-
graphic, ethnic, religious, or social class composition that 
compete with “collectivism” in explaining violent crime. 
This objection can be answered by directly controlling 
for those competing variables in multivariate statistical 
analyses (as was done in my aforementioned study). I have 
made these claims with respect to the end of the nine-
teenth century when the issue was the erosion of collectiv-
ism (as conceived by Durkheim) and the average birth rate 
was much higher than today. As for the present, one might 
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still ponder on the idea of using birth rates as an indicator – 
this time for assessing the relative weight of cooperative vs. 
disintegrative individualism.
Provided that sufficiently valid indicators have been pro-
vided, how do we establish causal relationships between 
the structural (economic, social, and cultural) indicators 
and rates of violent crime? Most of the indicators one 
might think of have trends that change over time: the gross 
national product, unemployment or divorce rates, insol-
vencies, and advertising budgets have been rising, trust 
in government institutions and membership in certain 
voluntary associations have been declining. If they were not 
trending – parallel with or contrary to…crime rates, they 
could not be valid indicators of potent explanatory vari-
ables in the first place. Trending series, however, correlate 
with each other even without any causal linkage. Causality 
can be tested only if stochastic trends correspond to each 
other, i. e., if the series are “cointegrated.” Cointegration 
tests can be run only with long time series; fifty measure-
ment points are often not sufficient, a rule of thumb calls 
for at least one hundred measurements.12 Note that in my 
explanatory scheme I search for level relationships not just 
for correlated change scores. But the rate of (rapid) change 
in a structural variable may – as noted before – have an ef-
fect that diverges from the long run level effect.
Pooled cross-sectional time series analyses are likely to be 
the most efficient design for studying long-term relation-
ships between structural indicators and crime rates. They 
offer better leverage for dealing with measurement prob-
lems. In causal analyses, measurement errors may be con-
ceived of as a special type of omitted variables. Omitted 
variables distort the estimation of impact parameters (like 
regression coefficients) only to the degree that they co-vary 
not just with the dependent but also with the independent 
variables specified in the model. Some of the measurement 
errors (and other uncontrolled sources of variance in the 
dependent variable) may systematically confound over-
time variance but less so the variances across units – or 
vice-versa.13 Besides, fixed-effect models may help to neu-
tralize cross-unit differences in legal provisions, policing, 
and registration practices.
To develop hypotheses regarding causal linkages between 
structural indicators and crime rates over time it might be 
helpful to start with cross-sectional data and individual 
level relationships, particularly if no sufficient time series 
data are available for the structural variables. For example, 
if there is a negative relationship between individuals’ trust 
in political or governmental institutions and the prob-
ability of committing acts of violent crime (Sampson and 
Bartusch 1998), it seems reasonable to assume that declin-
ing levels of trust (inferred, e.g., from a series of public 
opinion polls) would contribute to rising levels of violent 
crime. The problem with this strategy is that the evidence 
on social and political trust presented in the literature is 
rather mixed. And this applies to other potentially relevant 
variables as well. One only needs to look at the literature 
concerning the consequences of divorce or growing up in a 
one-parent family.
On the other hand, one has to realize that weak or even in-
significant relationships on the individual level do not rule 
out sizable effects on the aggregate level. For example, if 
only two out of every one hundred thousand persons new-
ly exposed during the course of a year to violent scenes 
produced by TV programs, internet platforms, or video 
games are thereby pushed over their personal probability 
threshold for committing murder, this might significantly 
increase the homicide rate in the country. But no experi-
mental setting with, say, two thousand individual subjects 
will demonstrate any significant effect for a probability 
difference of p = 0.000002.
Many of the structural changes are likely to have contra-
dictory effects upon crime rates. For example: increased 
female participation in the labor force may lead to de-
creased guardianship, increased exposure to crime, and 
less social control of children, all of which would help 
crime rates to rise. On the other hand, if more women are 
working, the improved economic conditions may reduce 
12 For an introduction to the statistical model of 
“cointegration” see, e.g., Hamilton (1994) or Thome 
(2005); for applications in criminological analyses 
see Field (1999), Hale (1998).
13 With respect to error-ridden measurements of 
suicide rates, a study by Pescosolido and Men-
delsohn (1986) is instructive here, demonstrating 
that such errors do not necessarily distort the 
impact parameters estimated for various explana-
tory variables.
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criminal motivations. Fajnzylber et al. (2002, 1328) state 
the ambiguous effects connected with rising levels of mass 
education as follows:
An individual’s education level…may impact on the 
decision to commit a crime through several channels. 
Higher levels of educational attainment may be associat-
ed with higher expected legal earning…Also, education, 
through its civic component, may increase the individ-
ual’s moral stance…On the other hand, education may 
reduce the costs of committing crimes…or may raise 
the loot from crime…Hence the net effect of education 
on the individual’s decision to commit a crime is, a 
priori, ambiguous. We can conjecture, however, that if 
legal economic activities are more skill- or education-in-
tensive than illegal activities, then it is more likely that 
education induces individuals not to commit crimes.
At any case, the aggregate relationship will reveal the net 
effect that a unit increase in the level of education (or other 
“ambiguous” structural variables) will have on the crime 
rate. For a methodological individualist this may not 
mean a great deal. But the aggregate effect may still guide 
his search for moderator variables that would specify 
which of possibly diverse effects apply to what category of 
individuals.
This brings up the (in)famous “ecological fallacy” theorem, 
which is one of the most misrepresented methodological 
theorems in the social sciences. Often it has been interpret-
ed as implying that regression estimates are always biased 
if they are based on aggregated data although they are 
interpreted with reference to individual-level relationships. 
Indeed, a positive “correlation” between the proportion of 
black people and the crime rate does not prove that black 
people commit more crimes than whites. It might well be 
the case that white people commit more and black people 
commit less crimes when the proportion of black people in 
a population increases. If this were the case, the bivariate 
relationship (with “crime” as the criterion and “race” as 
the predictor variable) would imply a grossly mis-specified 
model that excludes additive and multiplicative context ef-
fects. As Lutz Erbring (1989) put it: there is no aggregation 
bias, but, under specific circumstances, bias aggregation. 
If the model is correctly specified (with correct functional 
form and all of the relevant explanatory factors included) 
the slope coefficients (as causal effect measures) are unbi-
ased no matter what the aggregation level is. (The correla-
tion coefficients, of course, will be larger, but the size of 
correlation coefficients is irrelevant here). 
The sad fact, however, is that often our models are not cor-
rectly specified, due to lack of data or false reasoning. But 
in this case, individual level relationships may occasionally 
be more deceptive than aggregate level relationships. For 
example, zero correlation between long-term individual 
unemployment and readiness to commit crimes does not 
preclude rising unemployment levels causing higher crime 
rates. Being unemployed may directly stimulate individual 
motivation to commit criminal acts (as specified, e.g., by a 
theory of relative deprivation); it may also, as a contextual 
variable, indicate intensified competition and hence higher 
levels of criminogenic instrumentalism among the suc-
cessfully employed. In a bivariate individual-level relation-
ship the direct effect and the contextual effect may cancel 
each other out; in the aggregate relationship they would 
accumulate. Another example where an aggregate rela-
tionship can be meaningfully interpreted in the absence 
of an individual-level relationship is provided by David 
Halpern. In a cross-national analysis he found a significant 
relationship between “self-interested values” and “social 
trust” that disappeared when the correlation analysis was 
performed with individual-level data. Halpern comments: 
“This is indicative of an ecological effect and does seem to 
make sense. An individual can be selfish but still indepen-
dently recognize if those around them are to be trustwor-
thy.14 But it would be much odder if a society was generally 
composed of self-interested individuals yet also character-
ized as high in social trust” (Halpern 2001, 244). So if the 
number of selfish people increases, both the selfish and the 
unselfish person become more inclined to be distrustful.
Finally, if a relationship between macro-structural indica-
tors and crime rates has been established, this link is not 
14 More precisely, a selfish person is just as capable 
as an unselfish person in this respect, H.T.
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invalidated by missing specifications concerning interven-
ing variables that mediate between macro and micro level. 
As for structural equation modeling, Diekmann (1980) and 
Tuma and Hannan (1984) have shown that the total effect 
of exogenous variables can be reliably registered without 
intervening relationships (as long as the system under 
study is non-explosive). 
4. Concluding Remarks
It is obvious that the hypotheses explicated within the 
heuristic scheme presented here cannot in toto be tested 
directly in an empirical project. Most of the concepts and 
propositions need further clarification and specification. 
But it is hoped that the approach taken here will be helpful 
in integrating several perspectives in the study of violent 
crime hitherto left unconnected and often thought to be 
hopelessly unrelated to each other. In particular, it is hoped 
that convincing arguments have been offered in favor of 
conducting macro-level analyses in a historical perspec-
tive. A recently completed comparative study of social 
change and the development of violent crime in Sweden, 
England/Wales, and Germany from 1950 to 2000 may be 
relevant here (Thome and Birkel 2007). In this work we 
further elaborate the explanatory model outlined in the 
present article and apply it to the interpretation of a large 
set of empirical data taken from various statistical sources 
and survey evidence. The results of that study may thus 
help to evaluate the merits or flaws of the theoretical and 
methodological assumptions that have been advanced in 
this paper.
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